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TAXATION
I. DUTY AND AUTHORITY OF THE STATE TAX COMMISSIONER
State ex rel. Rose v. Fewell, 294 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 1982)
Killen v. Logan County Commission, 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va.. 1982)
In State ex rel. Rose v. Fewell' the West Virginia Supreme Court of Ap-
peals recognized the duty and authority of the State Tax Commissioner to en-
force compliance by county officials in the valuaton of property for tax
purposes.
In Fewell, the State Tax Commissioner had attempted, without success, to
have his new appraisals entered on the Putnam County land books. He then
sought a writ of mandamus against the Putnam County Assessor and Commis-
sioners, requesting that they either turn over the county property books to him
for adjustment to the new property values, or to adjust the property books
themselves.2
In granting the writ, the court noted the importance of the Tax Commis-
sioner's appraisals in light of Killen v. Logan County Commission3 decided on
the same day as Fewell. If the "actual and true" value of property is to be
taxed, the Tax Commissioner's appraisals take on increased importance. Under
Killen, the Tax Commissioner sets the appraised values for taxation. County
assessors have no discretionary powers of valuation and assessment and are left
with only ministerial duties.4 The Fewell court noted that the legislature em-
powered the Tax Commissioner to supervise tax assessors and county commis-
sioners in the assessment and valuation of property.5
In addition to the writ of mandamus, another possible method of enforce-
ment was noted by the court. The Tax Commissioner had issued a subpoena
for the property books," and he could have sought a writ of attachment enforc-
ing the subpoena in the Circuit Court of Putnam County.7
In 1965, the court had denied a writ of mandamus to the State Tax Com-
1 294 S.E.2d 434 (W. Va. 1982).
2 Id. at 435.
3 295 S.E.2d 689 (W. Va. 1982). In Killen, the court held that the long-recognized practice of
assessing property for taxes at between fifty and one hundred percent of its appraised value, as
authorized by W. VA. CODE § 18-9A-11 (Supp. 1981) was unconstitutional. The practice violated
the constitutional requirement of "equal and uniform taxation." W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1.
Under the court's model, the increased assessments could be offset by a reduction in tax rates
charged by the local governments. Killen, 295 S.E.2d at 707-08. However, public fear of higher
taxes produced an amendment to the West Virginia Constitution which limits the assessment of
property. Thus, the passage of the amendment by the West Virginia voters on November 2, 1982,
nullified the effect of the Killen decision as it relates to assessed property values.
Killen, 295 S.E.2d at 708.
5 Fewell, 294 S.E.2d at 437-38. In support of the legislative grant of power, the court cited W.
VA. CODE §§ 6-9-1 (1979), 11-1-2 (1974), 11-3-1 (Supp. 1982), 11-3-24 (Supp. 1982), and 18-9A-
11(g) (Supp. 1982).
8 The subpoena duces tecum was issued under W. VA. CODE § 6-9-7 (Supp. 1982).
Fewell, 294 S.E.2d at 438.
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missioner under circumstances similar to Fewell. That decision was overruled
in Pauley v. Kelly," where the court held that the Tax Commissioner had the
authority to enforce his duties. The Fewell court went a step further by al-
lowing a writ of mandamus and noting an alternative form of enforcement.
II. NOTICE TO DELINQUENT TAXPAYERS
Don S. Co. v. Roach, 285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981)
In Don S. Co. v. Roach,10 the court outlined what notice is necessary to a
delinquent taxpayer whose property is to be sold for nonpayment of taxes.
The taxpayers claimed that they were not adequately notified of their de-
linquent tax status and of the subsequent sale of their land for nonpayment of
taxes. At that time, West Virginia Code § 11A-3-2 required notice by publica-
tion in a local newspaper."
The court, in an opinion by Justice McGraw, determined that the taxpay-
ers had not received actual notice, and the trial record showed no publication
of notice. Therefore, the court reasoned, the taxpayers were denied due pro-
cess, and the tax deed was void.' 2 The court listed the taxpayer's illiteracy and
low educational level as mitigating factors which "must be considered in a case
such as this ....
The court did not explain how illiteracy fits into the scheme of due pro-
cess; nor did the court give practical guidelines, such as the degree of illiteracy
required for special treatment.
As the court noted, notice requirements to delinquent taxpayers have
changed since the amendment of West Virginia Code § 11A-1-8,14 requiring
actual notice. The court also gave a helpful outline of what actual notice
should include. 5
5 State ex rel. Rease v. Battle, 149 W. Va. 761, 143 S.E.2d 328 (1965), overruled, 255 S.E.2d
859 (W. Va. 1979).
9 255 S.E.2d 859, 881-82 (W. Va. 1979).
10 285 S.E.2d 491 (W. Va. 1981).
" W. VA. CODE § 11A-3-2 (1974).
"Don S. Co., 285 S.E.2d at 495-96. The opinion did not state whether or not notice by publi-
cation was given.
13 Id. at 496.
14 W. VA. CODE § 1lA-1-8 (Supp. 1982).
"I The notice should show what taxes are due, and how payment might be made. Also, the
notice should include:
... a statement that the failure to pay real property taxes could result in sale of the real
property by the State, and that if the land is not redeemed by the payment of delin-
quent taxes within eighteen months of the sale, the landowner risks the loss of all claim
to title.
Don S. Co., 285 S.E.2d at 496.
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III. MUNICIPAL TAXEs
Ellison v. City of Parkersburg, 284 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1981)
The court approved the City of Parkersburg's method of financing garbage
collection in Ellison v. City of Parkersburg.0 In Ellison, Parkersburg taxed
owners of real property to finance the city's garbage collection. The city rea-
soned that owners of real property either used that property or rented it to
others.
If the owners used their property, they were the proper parties to bill for
garbage services. The owners who rented their property had two options. The
city, with notice from the property owners, would bill the tenant, or the owner
could pay the tax and pass the cost to the tenant in the form of higher rent.17
Hence, the ultimate user paid for the garbage collection.
In an opinion by Justice McHugh, the court agreed with this logic and
found the plan to be within the confines of a city's statutory authority.18
IV. BusINESS AND OCCUPATION TAX
Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty, 285 S.E.2d 412 (W. Va. 1981)
In Capitol Cablevision Corp. v. Hardesty19 the court ruled that local tele-
vision cable companies must pay business and occupation taxes on local reve-
nues, even though the companies' function could be considered interstate in
nature.
Capitol Cablevision argued that it should not be taxed for two reasons.
First, by receiving out-of-state television broadcasts and transmitting them
into homes, the company was involved in interstate commerce. Therefore, tax-
ation of its gross revenues by West Virginia violated the equal protection guar-
antees of the United States Constitution.2 Next, Capitol Cablevision claimed
that its activities, including placing its own programming on a channel to cable
subscribers, constituted "broadcasting," which was exempt from business and
occupation taxes in West Virginia.21
The court, in an opinion by Justice McGraw, found neither argument per-
suasive. The mere fact that a business was involved in interstate commerce did
not preclude state taxation. Since Capitol Cablevision's revenues came from
purely local sources (cable subscribers in the Charleston area), the revenues
were taxable by West Virginia.2 2 However, only the in-state portion of revenues
were taxable. 23
Is 284 S.E.2d 903 (W. Va. 1981).
17 Id. at 906.
Is See W. VA. CODE § 8-13-13 (1976).
Is 285 S.E.2d 112 (W. Va. 1981).
20 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
21 W. VA. CODE § 11-13-3(g) (1978).
22 The court cited Fisher's Blend Station, Inc., v. Comm'r, 297 U.S. 650 (1936) as support for
its position.
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The court also found that Capitol Cablevision was not within the "broad-
casting" exemption to business and occupation taxes.2 Television cable com-
panies, to the court, were more like common carriers than broadcasters. Even
though Capitol Cablevision sent its own programming to subscribers, its activi-
ties essentially amounted to a "delivery service" of signals to local
subscribers.2 5
Since cable television companies are unique in nature, this decision will
have limited applicability to other business and occupation tax cases. However,
the principle of taxing local revenues of businesses engaged in interstate com-
merce appears well settled and is applicable to a wide variety of business
settings. 21
Charles D. Dunbar
2" W. VA. CODE § 11-13-3(g) (Supp. 1982).
2 285 S.E.2d at 420.
26 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc., v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), cited in Capitol Cablevi-
sion, 285 S.E.2d at 417-18.
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